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(1953) as amended,

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Appeal of a final order of a District Court was
filed in the Supreme Court for the State of Utah pursuant to
§78-2-2 (3) (i), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended.

The case

was poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition pursuant
to the power granted in §78-2-2(4).
The lower court granted Defendant Summary Judgment,
ruling that Plaintiffs1 claim was subject to the statute of
frauds and unenforceable.

At the hearing, Plaintiffs argued that

the oral contract between the parties was not within the statute
and, in the alternative, that writings sufficient to take the
contract out of the statute existed within Defendant's control.
Plaintiffs asked the court to defer a ruling on Defendant's
motion pending discovery of those writings, as provided in Rule
56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiffs' request was

denied, and Summary Judgment entered in favor of Defendant.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the lower court err in granting Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment where Plaintiffs had alleged the
existence of sufficient writings to take the contract out of the
ambit of the statute of frauds but had not had the opportunity to
pursue discovery procedures?
2*

Did the lower court err in concluding that the

statute of frauds was applicable to the contract between
Plaintiffs and Defendant which could be fully performed by one
party within one year?

-2-

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
§ 25-5-4(1), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended:
Certain Agreements void unless written
and subscribed. In the following cases every
agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof,
is in writing subscribed by the party to be
charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is
not to be performed within one year from
the making thereof. . . .
Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Should it appear from the affidavits of
a party opposing the motion that he cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify his opposition, the court
may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery
to be had or may make such other order as is just.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs commenced this action for damages in the
Third Judicial District Court, alleging that Defendant had
breached an oral contract to provide financing for Plaintiffs1
purchase of a residence in an agreed principal sum and at an
agreed rate of interest, (R 2-7).

Defendant moved to dismiss, (R

11-12) claiming that the oral contract was within the Statute of
Frauds and unenforceable as a contract not to be performed within
one year (R 15) and for which no documentation existed sufficient
to satisfy the statute of frauds* (R 15)•
Plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege the
existence of a written loan application (R 25) and memoranda and
documents evidencing Defendant's acceptance and agreement. (R
26).

In response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs

submitted an affidavit with regard to the existence of written
documents evidencing the loan agreement. (R 33-34).

Defendant

responded with a Memorandum and Affidavit. (R 44-58) .
At the hearing on Defendant's Motion, Plaintiffs argued
that (1) the oral contract to make a loan could be performed
fully by one of the parties within one year and (2) a decision as
to the existence of sufficient writings should be deferred until
Plaintiffs could pursue discovery procedures. (R 73-74).
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was granted, and Plaintiffs appeal therefrom.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 15th of December 1986, Plaintiffs made
written application to Defendant for a mortgage loan upon their
property at 10307 South Edgecliff Drive, Sandy, Utah. (R 25).
Defendant accepted Plaintiffs1 application and agreed
to lock in interest at the rate of nine percent (9%) per annum
with one (1) point, and to lend ninety percent (90%) of the
appraised value of the property, provided that Plaintiffs met
Defendants normal loan qualifications.

Plaintiffs believe that

the agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant was evidenced by
various writings executed by the parties.
Defendant approved Plaintiffs1 loan application and
scheduled the closing of the loan for April 27, 1987. The loan
to be closed was for the principal sum of $116,500.00 at nine
percent (9%) for thirty (30) years, with one percent (1%) to be
paid at the time of closing. (R 34A).

Plaintiff asserts that

documents in Defendant's file evidence the loan approval and
scheduled closing. (R 32-34).
In reliance upon Defendant's representation that
closing of the loan was imminent, Plaintiffs did not pay the
March and April payments on their pre-existing mortgage with City
Federal Savings and Loan.

On April 27, 1987, Defendant informed

Plaintiffs that the loan would not be closed as agreed.

Since

that date, Defendant has refused to close a loan upon the terms
and conditions agreed between the parties.

-5-

Plaintiffs commenced an action against Defendant on May
14, 1987, alleging that Defendant breached the oral contract to
close a loan to Plaintiffs on April 27, 1987. (R 2-7).

Defendant

moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint on the ground that the
contract between the parties was within the statute of frauds and
unenforceable. (R 11-17).

Plaintiffs then amended their

complaint and submitted an affidavit stating that writings
sufficient to establish the contract existed within the possession and control of Defendant. (R 25-40).

Defendant submitted

an affidavit denying the existence of any such documents within
Defendant's control. (R 44-46).
At the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the
Honorable Pat B. Brian of the Third Judicial District Court
determined that Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
required that the Motion be treated as a Motion for Summary
Judgment, pursuant to Rule 56(b). (R 59-60).

Plaintiffs' counsel

requested that a ruling be delayed until Plaintiffs could
instigate discovery procedures to obtain writings within
Defendant's possession and control. (R 73-74).
The lower court ruled in favor of Defendant. Summary
Judgment was entered on July 20, 1987. (R 59-60).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs appeal the order of the district court and
argue that the oral contract to make a loan to Plaintiffs could
be fully performed by one party within one year and, as a result,
was not within the statute of frauds.
Plaintiffs further contend that where there was an
issue of fact as to the existence of writings sufficient to
satisfy the statute of frauds and Plaintiffs had not yet had an
opportunity to pursue discovery, Summary Judgment was not appropriate, as established by Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

-7-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDMENT WHERE THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT
AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF DOCUMENTS.
The Supreme Court for the State of Utah has clearly
articulated the circumstances in which it is error for the trial
court to grant summary judgment.

"Summary Judgment is a

peremptory remedy, and a trial court, in determining whether a
material issue of fact exists for the purpose of applying Rule
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in a summary judgment
procedure, must view the facts and their inferences in the light
most favorable to the party moved against."

Spor v. Crested

Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 29 (1987),
(quoting W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627
P.2d 56,59 (Utah 1981)).

In cases involving the interpretation

of an agreement or a document, "it is not appropriate for a court
to weigh disputed evidence concerning such factors; the sole
inquiry to be determined is whether there is a material issue of
fact to be decided."

Id.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have also anticipated
and provided for those occasions when a party raises an issue of
fact but is prevented from presenting facts essential to justify
that position.

Rule 56(f) states as follows:

-ft-

When Affidavits are Unavailable, Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that he cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment
or may order a continuance to permit affidavits
to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other
order as is just.
Plaintiffs contend that Rule 56(f) should have been
applied by the lower court to defer a ruling on Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss until Plaintiffs could discover the documents
within Defendant's control and that summary judgment in favor of
Defendant was inappropriate in the circumstances.

Particular

documents were essential to Plaintiffs' defense to Defendant's
Motion based on the statute of frauds where the existence of
sufficient writings to satisfy the statute was alleged by Plaintiff Bryan Cannon's Affidavit,

(R 32-40).

Plaintiffs had not

had an opportunity, however, to obtain copies of the documents
Plaintiffs believe exist in Defendant's files.
The Court of Appeals of Kansas has held that summary
judgment should not be entered where the opposing party is
proceeding with due diligence with pretrial discovery but has not
had an opportunity to complete it. Caplinger v. Carter, 6 76 P.2d
1300 (Kan. App. 1984).

Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court con-

sidered a trial court's grant to plaintiff of summary judgment
where the defendant had not had an opportunity to present evidence and have findings of fact.

On appeal, the reviewing court

accepted the defendants' assertions as true and stated in

-9-

footnote that, in view of the State Constitution's guarantee of
access to the courts for protection of rights and redress of
wrongs, " . . . summary judgment, which denies opportunity for
trial, should be granted only when it clearly appears that there
is no reasonable probability that the party moved against could
prevail."

Utah State University, Etc. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d

715, 720 (Utah 1982).
In the case at hand, Plaintiffs had alleged by
affidavit the existence of documents that would satisfy the
statute of frauds and Defendant had, by affidavit, denied the
same.

Whether such documents existed was a question of fact and

where such disputes exist, a lower court cannot weigh the
evidence.

Plaintiffs contend that the court was obligated to

view their claims in the most favorable light and to give them
the opportunity to present evidence upon a question of fact.

In

these circumstances, summary judgment was a denial of Plaintiffs1
right to pursue discovery procedures and inappropriate.

POINT II
THE ORAL CONTRACT TO MAKE A LOAN IS NOT
WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Defendant agreed to
make them a loan to be repaid over a thirty-year period.

Al-

though the agreement was oral, Plaintiffs contend that documents
exist which would sufficiently substantiate the existence of the

-i n-

agreement and set forth its terms to satisfy the statute of
frauds.

Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs assert that the oral

agreement between the parties is not within the statute of frauds
because the agreement could be performed within one year,
A Wyoming court considered the application of the
statute of frauds and relied upon Section 198 of the Restatement
of the Law of Contracts, concluding that, "The words 'cannot be
fully performed1 must be taken literally.

The fact that perform-

ance within a year is highly improbable or not expected by the
parties does not bring a contract within the statute."
Pond, Inc. v. Clark, 238 P.2d 919, 925 (Wyo. 1951).

Hageman &

Apparently,

the provision of the statute of frauds which bars action on a
contract not to be performed within one year applies only to
those agreements which, b^ their terms, cannot be performed
within a year; hence, the traditional distinction between a
contract for employment for one year from a future date, to which
the statute applies, and a contract for employment for life, to
which the statute does not apply.
Utah caselaw is in accord.

For example, the Utah

Supreme Court has held that an action on an oral contract for the
exchange of farm land and shares of water stock was not barred by
the statute of frauds where the parties could easily have performed within a year, had they seen fit to do so. Christensen v.
Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P.2d 101 (1959).

Furthermore,

the general rule followed by most authorities and cited by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin is that in order for a
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bilateral contract to be subject to the one-year provision of the
statute of frauds, performance by both parties must extend beyond
one year, and not merely performance by one party.

Beacon Fed.

S.& L. Ans'n v. Panoramie Enterprises, Inc., 99 N.W.2d 696 (Wis.
1959).
Plaintiffs1 contract with Defendant was for a 30-year
mortgage, but Defendant's disbursement of funds to Plaintiffs
easily could have been performed by Defendant within one year.
The caselaw indicates that where full performance by either party
is easily possible within the year, the statute of frauds is not
applicable.

Defendant should not now be able to invoke the

statute in the absence of any evidence that performance within
one year was not possible, and in light of the Defendant's
assurances to Plaintiffs that the closing of the loan was
imminent.
Once again, Plaintiff argues that the issue of the
applicability of the statute of frauds is not appropriate for
summary judgment.

The same conclusion has been reached by the

Utah Supreme Court in similar fact situations. For example, a
Plaintiff appealed a summary judgment for defendant with regard
to a loan agreement under which the defendant bank agreed to make
advances to the plaintiff, a subcontractor, as needed and at a
later date refused to make advances.

The subcontractor sued for

breach of a loan agreement and the bank pleaded the statute of
frauds as a defense.

On appeal of the verdict for defendant, the

Utah Supreme Court held that whether the loan agreement could be

-i ?-

performed within a year was a question of fact, and that the
trial court's ruling that the agreement was offensive to the
statute as a matter of law was erroneous.
ed for trial.

The matter was remand-

M & S Construction & Eng. Co. v. Clearfield State

Bank, 19 Utah 2d 86, 426 P.2d 227 (1967).

Identical issues had

been addressed in Commercial Security Bank v. Hodson, in which
the Utah Supreme Court reversed summary judgment and held that
the statute of frauds would not bar an action for breach of a
loan agreement where the length of time of the loan was not
specified but no evidence indicated that it could not be
performed withing a year.

15 Utah 2d 388, 393 P.2d 482 (1964).

Such issues exist in the case at hand, and Plaintiffs
therefore request that this court reverse the lower court's grant
of summary judgment and allow the issues to be litigated.

CONCLUSION
It is Plaintiffs' contention that the loan agreement
sued upon is not subject to the statute of frauds because full
performance by one party was to be completed within one year.
However, Plaintiffs argue that the issue of the applicability of
the statute of frauds to the loan agreement conceded by Defendant
in its Motion to Dismiss turns on issues of fact inappropriate
for summary judgment.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs believe that,

should it be determined by the court that the agreement is within
the statute, sufficient writings exist to substantiate the
contract and its terms.

Plaintiffs appeal to the Court for a

decision that the loan agreement was not subject to the statute
of frauds as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a
reversal of the summary judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court to allow them to pursue discovery procedures.
Respectfully Submitted,
POOtfE, GANNON & SMIM

tiJE R. sMrnr"'
DENNIS K. POOLE
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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